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CHAPTER 9 
Security and Mortgages 
AUSTIN T. STICKELLS 
§9.1. Conditional sales and chattel mortgages: Rights against 
negligent third parties. Two recent cases clarify the rights of condi-
tional vendors and chattel mortgagees when a third party negligently 
damages the collateral or property subject to the security interest. 
Bell Finance Co. v. Gefter 1 held that a conditional vendor can proceed 
against a third party negligently damaging the security even though 
the vendee is not in default. Under these circumstances the vendor 
can recover the entire amount of damage, even though the damages 
exceed the debt. The decision is based upon the principle that a 
secured party is entitled to unimpaired security. Any amount in ex-
cess of the debt would be held for the benefit of the conditional vendee 
or secured party. The effect of contributory negligence would be con-
trolled by the 1958 SURVEY year decision of Harvard Trust Co. v. Ra-
cheotes.2 
In Massachusetts a conditional vendor can recover from a third per-
son even though the conditional vendee was concurrently negligent. 
This principle was reached by analogy to bailment cases in Morris 
Plan Co. v. Hillcrest Farms Dairy, Inc.3 However, the Morris case did 
not determine whether this rule applied when the damage to the se-
curity was greater than the debt. The Racheotes case held that the 
mortgagee may sue for damage to the security caused by a third person 
although the mortgagor was concurrently negligent and even though 
the damages exceeded the debt. The amount of recovery was not 
governed by the Gefter case; the recovery is limited to the amount of 
the debt. The result of the decision is twofold: (I) the mortgagee is 
not bound by the negligence of the mortgagor (or conditional vendee) 
and (2) the mortgagor gains to the extent that the debt is reduced by 
the collection of the judgment. 
§9.2. Conditional sales: Waiver of defenses. In Quality Finance 
Co. v. Hurley 1 a blanket waiver provided: 
AUSTIN T. STICKELLS is Professor of Law at Boston University and a member of 
the American and Boston Bar Associations. 
§9.1. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 305, 147 N.E.2d 815. 
21958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 309, 147 N.E.2d 817. This case and the Gefter case, 
note 1 supra, are fully discussed in §§3.2 and 7.2 supra. 
3323 Mass. 452, 82 N.E.2d 889 (1948). 
§9.2. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 397, 148 N.E.2d 385. See further comment on this 
case in §7.2 supra. 
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If this contract is purchased from the Seller, the purchaser shall 
have all the rights of the Seller, and in any suit the Buyer waives 
as against any such purchaser ... all rights, remedies and de-
fenses which the Buyer may now and at any time have hereunder 
against the Seller to set off . . . rescission . . . and otherwise. 
The waiver was held invalid as in conflict with the policy of G.L., c. 
231, §5, which subjects the assignee of a non-negotiable legal chose in 
action to all the defenses and rights of counterclaim, recoupment or 
set-off to which the defendant would have been entitled had the action 
been brought in the name of the assignor. The Supreme Judicial 
Court indicated that there was a strong public policy of protecting 
conditional vendees against imposition by conditional vendors and 
instalment houses. To uphold the waiver clause would give a non-
negotiable agreement the attribute of negotiability. 
Section 9-206 of the Uniform Commercial Code 2 recognizes waiver 
of all defenses except defenses of a type that can be asserted against a 
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under Article 3, in 
transactions other than those in the consumer field. As to consumer 
goods, the section subjects waiver to any statute or decision that estab-
lishes a different rule for the buyer of consumer goods. Paragraph 2 
of the Uniform Commercial Code Comments to Section 9-206 states 
that the article takes no position as to the effect of such waivers in 
consumer goods cases, but subjects such waivers to statutes or decisions 
restricting the waivers' effectiveness. Under this interpretation of the 
Uniform Commercial Code the Hurley case would control as a "de-
cision which establishes a different rule for buyers of consumer goods." 
§9.3. Conditional sales: Trade-ins. General Laws, c. 255, §12 re-
quires that there be included in a conditional sales agreement a de-
scription of the property to be traded in, "if any," and the trade-in 
allowance thereon. In Lepore v. Atlantic Corp.l it was contended 
that the statute required that the contract contain affirmative state-
ments that no property was traded in and that there was no credit 
allowance or prepayments. This contention was rejected by the Su-
preme Judicial Court. It was held that, although the Conditional 
Sales Act 2 was enacted for the benefit and protection of the consuming 
public and conditional vendees and is to be strictly construed in their 
favor, the words "if any" in the statute indicated that such information 
need be stated only if there was a trade-in or trade-in allowance. The 
same result will obtain under the Uniform Commercial Code.s 
§9.4. Foreclosure of mortgage: Publication of notice. General 
Laws, c. 244, §14 provides that foreclosure of a mortgage under a 
power of sale is ineffective unless notice has been published 
2 Ann. Laws Mass. new c. 106, Comments 1 and 2 to §9-206 (Special Supp. 1958). 
§9.3. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 335, 148 N.E.2d 279. 
2 G.L., c. 255, §§1l-13H, now partly amended and partly superseded by the Uni-
form Commercial Code, G.L., c. 106. 
3 UCC §9-203(2) will require the application of G.L., c. 255, §12. 
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in a newspaper, if any, published in the town where the land lies. 
If no newspaper is published in the town the notice may be pub-
lished in a newspaper published in the county where the land lies. 
A newspaper which by its title page purports to be published or 
printed in such town, city, or county, and having a circulation 
therein, shall be sufficient for the purpose. 
In Gladstone v. Treasurer and Receiver General 1 the plaintiff sought 
relief on the grounds that foreclosure by power of sale of the mortgage 
on her lands in Billerica required that notice be published in the 
"Billerica News," whereas notice was actually published in the "Lowell 
Sun." The Supreme Judicial Court held that the place of publication 
of a newspaper was one of fact and the evidence adduced in the Land 
Court showed that the "Billerica News" was not actually published in 
Billerica but was published in Lowell. On these facts the plaintiff 
could not prevail since, if no newspaper was actually published in the 
town where the land lies, the mortgagee has his choice of selecting any 
paper published in the county where the land lies. The statutory pro-
vision that the mortgagee may use "a newspaper which by its title page 
purports to be published or printed in [the] town" is merely permissive. 
§9.5. Chattel mortgages: Foreclosure. Two recent chattel mort-
gage cases were concerned with the validity of foreclosure proceedings 
and in both the mortgagor prevailed. In Francis v. Mogul 1 the mort-
gagee was estopped from foreclosing because of his assurances that he 
would leave the mortgage in status quo until the truck, which was the 
security, had been repaired and put into operation, and that he would 
apply the insurance proceeds for the repair of the truck. In Salter v. 
Leventhal,2 after notice of foreclosure had been delivered, the mort-
gagee stated "Don't be alarmed over it, it is just a matter of formality. 
Take it home and don't show it to anyone." He subsequently stated 
to the mortgagor that it was just a formality and that "he [the mort-
gagee] wasn't going to do anything about it." These statements and 
other conduct were sufficient to estop the mortgagee from relying upon 
the notice of foreclosure. The facts in the Salter case are very interest-
ing with respect to the question of a fair sale. It was held that there 
were sufficient facts to show a controlled sale in bad faith. 
§9.6. Liens and attachments. Certain points in relation to the 
general heading of creditor's rights have been decided in several 1958 
SURVEY year cases. North End Auto Park, Inc. v. Petringa Trucking 
CO.l held that a garage keeper's lien under C.L., c. 255, §§25 and 26 
was not lost by temporary surrender, even though there was a daily 
surrender of possession and daily use of the vehicles by the owner. A 
§9.4. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 283, 147 N.E.2d 786. 
§9.5. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 871, 150 N.E.2d 924. 
21958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1007, 151 N.E.2d 275. 
§9.6. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 929, 150 N.E.2d 735. See further comment on this 
case in §7.6 supra. 
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bona fide purchaser or attaching or levying creditor without knowledge 
of the lienor's interest would have superior rights. Marrs v. Barbeau 2 
held that an attachment of an airplane would be valid although it was 
unrecorded under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.3 In Valentine 
Lumber &- Supply Co. v. Thibeault 4 it was held that a mechanics lien 
was defeated by failure to file an attested copy of the subpoena, al-
though the bond to dissolve the lien was filed and recorded, and con-
tained all the information that would have been contained in the 
subpoena. Under the requirement of strict compliance with the stat-
ute the bond would not be deemed a substitute for the subpoena. 
2336 Mass. 416, 146 N.E.2d 353 (1957). See further comment on this case in §7.4 
supra. 
349 U.S.C. §§401(18), 523(c). 
4, 336 Mass. 407, 411,412, 146 N.E.2d 347, 349,351 (1957). 
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